Non-medical sex selection is premised on the notion that the sexes are not interchangeable. Studies of individuals who undergo sex selection for non-medical reasons, or who have a preference for a son or daughter, show that they assume their child will conform to the stereotypical roles and norms associated with their sex. However, the evidence currently available has not succeeded in showing that the gender traits and inclinations sought are caused by a “male brain” or a “female brain”. Therefore, as (...) far as we know, there is no biological reason why parents cannot have the kind of parenting experience they seek with a child of any sex. Yet gender essentialism, a set of unfounded assumptions about the sexes which pervade society and underpin sexism, prevents parents from realising this freedom. In other words, unfounded assumptions about gender constrain not only a child’s autonomy, but also the parent’s. To date, reproductive autonomy in relation to sex selection has predominantly been regarded merely as the freedom to choose the sex of one’s child. This paper points to at least two interpretations of reproductive autonomy and argues that sex selection, by being premised on gender essentialism and/or the social pressure on parents to ensure their children conform to gender norms, undermines reproductive autonomy on both accounts. (shrink)

Premenstrual dysphoric disorder was recently moved to a full category in the DSM-5 . It also appears set for inclusion as a separate disorder in the ICD-11 . This paper argues that PMDD should not be listed in the DSM or the ICD at all, adding to the call to recognise PMDD as a socially constructed disorder. I first present the argument that PMDD pathologises understandable anger/distress and that to do so is potentially dangerous. I then present evidence that PMDD (...) is a culture-bound phenomenon, not a universal one. I also argue that even if medication produces a desired effect, there are biological correlates with premenstrual anger/distress, such anger/distress seems to occur monthly, and women are more likely than men to be diagnosed with affective disorders, none of these factors substantiates that premenstrual anger/distress is caused by a mental disorder. I argue that to assume they do is to ignore the now accepted role that one’s environment and psychology play in illness development, as well as arguments concerning the social construction of mental illness. In doing so, I do not claim that there are no women who experience premenstrual distress or that their distress is not a lived experience. My point is that such distress can be recognised and considered significant without being pathologised and that it is unethical to describe premenstrual anger/distress as a mental disorder. Further, if the credibility of women’s suffering is subject to doubt without a clinical diagnosis, then the way to address this problem is to change societal attitudes towards women’s suffering, not to label women as mentally ill. The paper concludes with some broader implications for women and society of the change in status of PMDD in the DSM-5 as well as a sketch of critical policy suggestions to address these implications. (shrink)

In ‘Parental Genetic Shaping and Parental Environmental Shaping’, Anca Gheaus argues there is a normative difference between parents using genetic means to influence the development of their child, and parents using environmental means to achieve the same ends. Genetic shaping but not environmental shaping, it is claimed, introduces a negative asymmetry in the child–caregiver relationship. In this paper, we argue that Gheaus’ argument fails as a critique of genetic shaping, and does not establish a moral difference between genetic and environmental (...) shaping. Contrary to Gheaus’ arguments in both ‘Parental Genetic Shaping and Parental Environmental Shaping’ and ‘Parental Enhancement and Symmetry of Power in the Parent–Child Relationship’, we also argue that even if genetic or prebirth shaping introduces further inequality in the parent–child relationship, this is not necessarily a bad thing, and it is not clear how a parent refraining from taking up the availability of such technology leaves the child better off. (shrink)

The paper by De Bie et al. (2023) provides an overview of various ethical arguments related to artificial womb technology (AWT). We believe some important feminist concerns about this technology ne...

Several months ago, an Israeli resident in emergency medicine engaged in a hunger strike to protest 26-hour shifts. His protest was part of a country-wide struggle of medical residents from all disciplines against such long shifts, arguing that they are a thing of the past, and that they harm patient care. While there is actually no evidence that long shifts harm patient outcomes, they very likely reduce civility among staff members and towards patients.1 Two kinds of strategies are possible to (...) address this likely source of incivility: expect and train residents to be kinder and more patient towards their peers and patients, or do away with long shifts. Therein lies the tension in implementing the case for civility made by McCollough et al 2 should we invest in agent-based or system-based interventions? Virtue ethics is prominent in discussions of the professional duties of healthcare providers (HCPs). A common theme that threads throughout these discussions is that HCPs ought to, or are expected to behave in a kind, patient and sensitive manner towards their peers and patients, …. (shrink)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many daughters, sisters, aunts, wives, and mothers found themselves with additional caretaking duties, and many were also vulnerable and unsafe in different constellations of relationships. Lockdown exacerbated this vulnerability. It also heightened stress, as vulnerable women were required to be constantly alert and risk aware in their reconfigured worlds. This not only included women in unsafe intimate relationships but also digital vulnerability for women as life moved online, economic risk for casually employed women unable to work (...) from home, and even increased exposure to misogyny for female political leaders navigating polarizing and volatile political communities. Whilst... (shrink)

‘Gender disappointment’ is the feeling of sadness when a parent’s strong desire for a child of a certain sex is not realised. It is frequently mentioned as a reason behind parents’ pursuit of sex selection for social reasons. It also tends to be framed as a mental disorder on a range of platforms including the media, sex selection forums and among parents who have been interviewed about sex selection. Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether ‘gender disappointment’ represents (...) a unique diagnosis. We argue that ‘gender disappointment’ does not account for a unique, distinct category of mental illness, with distinct symptoms or therapy. That said, we recognise that parents’ distress is real and requires psychological treatment. We observe that this distress is rooted in gender essentialism, which can be addressed at both the individual and societal level. (shrink)

What is family-centred care of a hospitalized child? A critical understanding of the concept of family-centred care is necessary if this widely preferred model is to be differentiated from other health care ideals and properly evaluated as appropriate to the care of hospitalized children. The article identifies distinguishable interpretations of family-centred care that can pull health professionals in different, sometimes conflicting directions. Some of these interpretations are not qualitatively different from robust interpretations of the ideals of parental participation, care-by-parent and (...) partnership in care that are said to be the precursors of family-centred care. A prominent interpretation that regards the child and his or her family collectively as the ‘unit of care’ arguably arises from ambiguity and is significantly problematic as a model for the care of hospitalized children. Clinical practice driven by this interpretation can include courses of action that do not aim to do what will best promote a hospitalized child’s welfare, and such cases will not be unusual. More broadly, this interpretation raises challenging questions about the responsibilities and authority of health professionals in relation to the interests of hospitalized children and their families. (shrink)